A B S T R A C T
Between
Action and Existence. On Meaning and Finitude in Arendt and
Heidegger
Miika Luoto
Phil.Lic., researcher, Department of Aesthetics, Institute
for Art Research
University of Helsinki
For Arendt, the meaning of action, of the sharing of words
and deeds, lies in its original capacity to endow the world
with a meaning. For Heidegger, the meaning of existence, of
the understanding of the being that is always at stake in
one’s own being, is also the opening of meaning and,
thereby, of a world. To speak of meaning today, however,
requires that one respond to the general loss of meaning,
the self-devaluation of absolute values diagnosed by
Nietzsche. The responses of both Arendt and Heidegger to
our age as one of revealed nihilism point to human finitude
constitutive of meaning: Her attempt to disclose the
meaning of political action in a radically new way, by
emphasizing its essential plurality and fragility, and his
attempt to disclose anew the meaning of the forgotten
question of being, refer both to finitude as a fundamental
characteristic of man covered over by the philosophical
tradition. Their fundamental difference, however, concerns
the primary place of the opening of meaning: for Arendt, it
is the public realm of opinion and political judgement, for
Heidegger, especially from the mid 30’s on, that is,
after his political involvement with National Socialism, it
is the creation of a work. In my paper, I will address the
philosophical difference between Arendt and Heidegger in
reference to the question concerning the finitude
constitutive of meaning. This will, I hope, give a more
detailed understanding of their respective relations to the
praxis-poiesis –distinction and, moreover, delimit
the meaning of an Arendtian critique of Heidegger.
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